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Abstract
This paper presents a novel way to disentangle inequality aversion over time
from inequality aversion between regions in the computation of the Social Cost
of Carbon. Our approach nests a standard efficiency based Social Cost of Carbon estimate and an equity weighted Social Cost of Carbon estimate as special
cases. We also present a methodology to incorporate more fine grained regional
resolutions of income and damage distributions than typically found in integrated
assessment models. Finally, we present quantitative estimates of the Social Cost
of Carbon that use our disentangling of different types of inequality aversion.
We use two integrated assessment models (FUND and RICE) for our numerical
exercise to get more robust findings. Our results suggest that inequality considerations lead to a higher (lower) SCC values in high (low) income regions relative
to an efficiency based approach, but that the effect is less strong than found in
previous studies that use equity weighting. Our central estimate is that the Social
Cost of Carbon increases roughly by a factor of 2.5 from a US perspective when
our disentangled equity weighting approach is used.
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Introduction

Studies that estimate the Social Cost of Carbon (Greenstone et al., 2013; Nordhaus,
2014) aggregate climate change impacts that accrue to societies at very different stages
of development: a single Social Cost of Carbon estimate is the sum of the marginal
damages to all countries at all future times, so it includes for example harms to a rich
developed society like the US today and a poor developing country like Mozambique
today. But it also includes impacts to these same countries in a hundred years, and
typically they are assumed to have dramatically changed in terms of socio-economic
development over such a long time horizon (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000).
Any type of cost-benefit or policy analysis that covers such a heterogeneous set of
affected parties will at some point face the question whether (and if yes, how) the large
income differences between the affected parties should be taken into consideration for
the analysis. The most common type of applied analysis in the economics of climate
change ignores income differences between countries by deferring to the Kaldor-Hicks
potential compensation criterion (or some variant of it): such an analysis tries to identify
policies that maximize the size of the economic pie and relegates any distributional
objectives to a separate analysis and non-climate policy instruments (Nordhaus and
Yang, 1996).
At the same time there exists a long-standing literature in climate economics that
incorporates distributional equity objectives into the analysis of climate policy. This
literature has its roots in the literature on distributional weights in cost-benefit analysis
(Little and Mirrlees, 1974; Mirrlees, 1978), but runs under the headline of “equity
weighting” in the climate economics literature (Azar and Sterner, 1996; Fankhauser et
al., 1997; Azar, 1999; Anthoff et al., 2009b; Anthoff and Tol, 2010; Dennig et al., 2015).
Equity weighted Social Cost of Carbon estimates have been produced by the groups
that maintain the three major cost-benefit integrated assessment models DICE/RICE
(Nordhaus, 2011), FUND (Anthoff et al., 2009a) and PAGE (Hope, 2008), and when
the United Kingdom decided to use a Social Cost of Carbon in their regulatory process
in the early 2000s they used an equity weighted Social Cost of Carbon (Watkiss and
Hope, 2011).
Existing equity weighting studies assume a social welfare function (SWF) that exhibits inequality aversion over per capita consumption levels both over time and between individuals. The level of inequality aversion in these setups is determined by a
single parameter, and consequently one cannot represent different degrees of inequality
aversion say over time and between countries or regions.
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The first contribution of this paper is to disentangle intertemporal inequality aversion from regional inequality aversion. We propose a modified social welfare function
that is based on separate parameters for inequality aversion over time and inequality
aversion between individuals or regions. In some ways this is a similar project to the
disentangling of risk aversion and intertemporal fluctuation aversion (Epstein and Zin,
1989), but for a different set of parameters in the SWF.
Our new welfare specification is able to nest both a purely efficiency based approach
that ignores distributional questions between individuals and the existing equity weighting approach as special cases of our more general welfare function. Our new specification
also makes it easier to use existing estimates of preferences over distributions of income
to pin down the parameters of the welfare function. One can calibrate the between
individuals inequality aversion parameter by looking at studies that either estimate an
inequality aversion parameter from observed income tax schedules or observations of altruistic giving (Evans, 2005; Clarkson and Deyes, 2002; Tol, 2010; Johansson-Stenman
et al., 2002). For the inequality aversion parameter over time (intertemporal fluctuation
aversion), one can refer to market observations (e.g., based on consumption-savings decisions) or normative reasoning (Cline, 1992; Nordhaus, 2007; Dasgupta, 2008). From
a theoretical point of view there is no reason to assume that these two types of inequality aversion should be equal, and the empirical literature indeed finds vastly different
estimates for the two parameters. Our welfare specification allows incorporation of this
fact into the computation of the Social Cost of Carbon in a consistent way.
The second contribution of the paper is a new way to incorporate detailed distributional data and assumptions about income and damages into coarse regional integrated
assessment models. Typical integrated assessment models divide the world into 1016 regions. While heterogeneity between regions is therefore explicitly accounted for,
these models assume away any income inequality within a given region of the model.
We present concise analytic expressions that augment the discount factors used to compute the Social Cost of Carbon that incorporate different distributional assumptions on
the sub-regional distribution of income and climate impacts. We then use these analytical results with a typical integrated assessment model to compute an equity weighted
Social Cost of Carbon that takes inequality at a sub-regional level into account.
The third part of the paper presents Social Cost of Carbon estimates using this
new welfare function and compares them to the existing equity weighting and efficiency
based Social Cost of Carbon estimates. We use the integrated assessment models FUND
3.9 (Waldhoff et al., 2014) and RICE-2010 (Nordhaus, 2010) for our numerical exercise.
We use multiple models to make sure our results are not dependent on the particular
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assumptions (both structural and parametric) made in a single numerical integrated
assessment models. We chose the two models based on their ability to estimate a
Social Cost of Carbon, their ability to produce regional results and their open source
availability.

2

Discounting and equity weighting

Most welfare economic studies of climate policy that use Integrated Assessment Models
(IAMs) are based on a Utilitarian Social Welfare Function (SWF) of the discounted
utility form. Social Welfare of all individuals i = 1..I can then be written as
W =

I
T X
X

U (cit )(1 + ρ)−t

(1)

t=0 i=1

where cit is consumption of individual i at time t, ρ denotes the pure rate of time
preference and T the end of the planning horizon. It is well known that regional
inequality aversion, risk aversion1 , and intertemporal fluctuation aversion are all determined by the curvature of the utility function U in this framework and thus coincide.
For instance, for the standard case of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
U (c) = c1−η (1 − η)−1 , all three types of inequality aversion are determined by the single
parameter η.2
In numerical Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs), all variables are computed for
R regions with population sizes Prt and therefore, a slightly different version of (1) is
used. Implicitly, consumption is assumed to be equally distributed within each given
region equal to the average consumption per capita level crt . Moreover, we denote by
P
Pt = R
r=1 Prt the size of world population at time t. The SWF then becomes
W =

T X
R
X

Prt U (crt )(1 + ρ)−t

(2)

t=0 r=1

We will use this welfare function in order to evaluate the impacts (damages or benefits)
from climate change, which are derived from numerical models together with assumptions about the socioeconomic variables. The numerical models provide an estimate of
the effect of one additional ton of CO2 emitted today. This effect will be experienced at
1

We abstract from risk and uncertainty in this paper.
For the case of η = 1, the utility function is U (c) = log(c) which is the limit of U (c) =
η tends to one. To improve readability we leave out the constant additive term.
2
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c1−η −1
1−η

as

all future times and in all regions, and is denoted by marginal damages Drt . We express
the effect as damages, i.e. positive numbers are a harmful impact whereas negative values indicate benefits from global warming. We further assume that Drt is expressed as
an economic consumption loss, so that one can easily compare it to the assumed baseline
consumption levels. Combining the disaggregated estimate of marginal damages with
the SWF (2) and a CRRA utility function enables us to compute the welfare impact
of a series of regional and temporal marginal damages. Basically, marginal damages
at date t in region r are weighted by discounted marginal utility of consumption, i.e.
−t
by U 0 (crt )(1 + ρ)−t = c−η
rt (1 + ρ) . These weighted marginal damages estimates can
then be summed over time and regions to arrive at an aggregated measure of marginal
damage, which is expressed in utility units.
For most real world applications it is convenient to have marginal damages expressed
in monetary terms, rather than in utility units. In a final step, the marginal damage
estimate therefore must be converted into monetary units. In principle one would just
divide the marginal damage estimate expressed in utility units by marginal utility of
income or consumption in the present to convert from utility to monetary units. Income
inequality in the present however implies that the marginal utility of income is different
between regions and therefore the conversion depends on the choice of the reference or
normalization region. Unless potentially very large transfers equating marginal utilities
are allowed3 this yields different monetary values for different reference regions of the
aggregated marginal damages as shown in Anthoff et al. (2009a).
Fankhauser et al. (1997) proposed to convert the obtained values from utility into
monetary terms using marginal utility of present average world per-capita consumption.
Any given region x can however be used using its marginal utility today c−η
x0 . Note that
the choice of the region x does not alter the basic cost benefit analysis interpretation of
the results. Rather, it is a constant multiplicative term and merely yields a monetary
interpretation of the result allowing a direct comparison with abatement costs in the
given region (see Anthoff et al. (2009b) for a more detailed discussion). In order to make
the numerical results comparable with previous studies we take the U.S. as reference
region x throughout this paper.
To summarize this method, we can write the Social Cost of Carbon SCCx , that is
the damage of one additional ton of CO2 emissions in the present expressed as a welfare
3

Alternatively, Negishi weights can be used in the SWF specification to equate marginal welfare
gains from income in different regions, see Nordhaus and Yang (1996).
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equivalent change in consumption in region x, as
SCCx =

T X
R
X
c−η
rt

−η (1
t=0 r=1 cx0

+ ρ)−t Drt .

(3)

This formulation is the equity weighting scheme used in Anthoff et al. (2009b), Hope
(2008), and Nordhaus (2011). Damages in a region with lower than average consumption per capita are relatively over-weighted due to decreasing marginal utility. Moreover, in this formulation, equity weights and the social discount rate are inseparable.
Nordhaus (2011) refers to this approach as the “conceptually and philosophically more
appropriate” intertemporal approach, in contrast to the “cross-sectional approach” advocated by Fankhauser et al. (1997). We agree in that this is the correct perspective
from a welfare perspective and take the intertemporal approach as our starting point.
For the remainder of this chapter, we will derive a version of SCCx that allows
to separate regional inequality aversion from intertemporal inequality aversion. In the
next chapter we will then further modify the equation to take inequality within regions
into account.
In general, the value of the Social Cost of Carbon can be expressed using the welfare
function (2) in the following way
SCCx =

∂W
∂cx0

!−1 T R
XX

∂W
Drt .
t=0 r=1 ∂crt

(4)

The first step is to modify the SWF such that one can distinguish regional inequality
aversion from intertemporal inequality aversion. Our approach is in the spirit of the
recursive model by Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Epstein and Zin (1989). The authors
developed a preference model allowing for distinct time and risk preferences. In our
context, the qualitatively similar concepts of uncertainty and inequality allow us to use
a similar concept in the dynamic context considered. The results however require a
different interpretation, most notably due to the fact that there is no uncertainty about
today while inequality prevails also today.
Preferences by the social planner are now characterized by two functions: firstly, at
any point in time, welfare is evaluated by aggregating consumption across regions using
the utility function U (crt ). This utility function captures inequality aversion between
regions andis used to compute
the equally-distributed equivalent level of consumption

Prt
ede
−1 PR
ct = U
r=1 Pt U (crt ) , see Atkinson (1970). It can be interpreted as the value of
per-capita consumption that, if it were equally distributed across regions, would yield
6

the exact same level of welfare as the observed levels of per-capita consumption.
Secondly, welfare is aggregated over the time horizon using the time aggregation
function V (cede
t ) which aggregates the equally-distributed equivalent levels of consumption over time. Finally, exponential utility discounting is used to compute the present
value of global welfare. That is, our welfare specification W R , where the superscript R
refers to the regional inequality that is considered, can be written as
R

W =

T
X

"

Pt V U

t=0

−1

R
X

!#

Prt
U (crt )
r=1 Pt

(1 + ρ)−t .

(5)

−1 ede 1−η
Using isoelastic specifications for both functions as V (cede
and
t ) = (1 − η) (ct )
−1
1−γ
U (crt ) = (1 − γ) crt
as in the Epstein-Zin specification (Weil, 1990), the SWF reads
T
X

R
X
1
Prt 1−γ
Pt
WR =
c
1 − η r=1 Pt rt
t=0

1−η
! 1−γ

(1 + ρ)−t

(6)

where η can be interpreted as inverse of the elasticity of substitution (or intertemporal
inequality aversion) whereas γ represents the degree of regional inequality aversion. This
welfare function has previously been used in the context of the consumption discount
rate in Emmerling (2011).
It can be easily shown that W R is equivalent to W if η = γ, i.e. the welfare function
previously used in equity weighting studies. Using this particular parameterization of
the welfare function W R to derive the expression for the Social Cost of Carbon by
applying the definition of SCCx from (4) leads to the standard equity weighted Social
Cost of Carbon equation (3). If, on the other hand, U (crt ) is an affine function exhibiting
regional inequality neutrality
(i.e., in the isoelastic specification, setting γ = 0), we get
P
PT
R
Prt
−t
R
that W = t=0 Pt V
r=1 Pt crt (1 + ρ) . In this formulation welfare only depends
on global average per capita consumption levels, i.e. any inequality in consumption
between regions is ignored in the welfare evaluation. The corresponding Social Cost of
Carbon expression discounts world marginal damages with one Ramsey discount rate
that depends on the global per capita consumption growth rate. This case is equivalent
to a standard efficiency based estimate of the Social Cost of Carbon, as for example
obtained by the DICE model.
In general, however, we obtain a new formula SCC R for the Social Cost of Carbon
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by using the same definition of (4). After some reformulations it can be shown that
SCCxR

=

T X
R
X
t=0 r=1

P



cede
t
ede
c0

!γ−η −γ

crt
−t
−γ (1 + ρ) Drt
cx0

(7)

1

R
Prt 1−γ 1−γ
=
where cede
represents the global ’equally distributed equivalent’
r=1 Pt crt
t
level of consumption taking into account regional inequalities.4
We can rewrite this equation such that we can distinguish the relevant driving forces
that determine the weights attached to the individual impacts at each point in time
and in each region:

SCCxR

=

T X
R
X
t=0 r=1

crt /cr0
ede
cede
t /c0

!η−γ −γ −η

cr0 crt
−t
−γ −η (1 + ρ) Drt
cx0 cr0

(8)

c−η

rt
First, the standard Ramsey discount factor in each region c−η
(1 + ρ)−t is used to
r0
convert all values into present values in the respective region. Second, the equity weight
c−γ
r0
convert each region’s present values into a welfare equivalent change of consumption
c−γ
x0

in region x that is used as the reference region (e.g., as in Azar and Sterner (1996)). The
exact role of the equity weight depends on the relative rank in the income distribution
of the regions as of today: the weight will be larger than one if it converts an impact
from a poorer region to a wealthier reference region, but will be lower than unity if
it converts a present value impact from a richer region to a poorer reference region.
If γ = η, those are the only determinants that finally allow to aggregate the impacts
into one value, since the remaining term is just equal to unity in this case. In that
case we are back to the standard equity weighted values used throughout the literature
(Fankhauser et al. (1997), Anthoff et al. (2009a) and Hope (2008)).
If thetwo parameters are different, we get the additional weighting factor Ωrt ≡

crt /cr0
ede
cede
t /c0

η−γ

. If γ < η, i.e. regional inequality aversion is lower than intertemporal

inequality aversion, this factor is greater than one for a region that is growing faster than
the world on average. This is intuitive since in this case regional inequality concerns
are less pronounced and therefore weights assigned to countries are higher for regions
that relatively richer at time t in the future. If, on the other hand, regional inequality
concerns are larger, i.e., γ > η, the factor Ωrt is smaller than unity for countries that
4

This interpretation refers to the distribution of income only between regions, but weighted by
the population size. This is what Bourguignon et al. (2006) refers to as ’international distribution of
income’ or ’Concept 2 Inequality’.
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become relatively richer in the future. Given that now regional inequality concerns
are more important than intertemporal inequality aversion, a higher weight is given to
impacts that occur in regions that are becoming poorer in the future relatively to world
average at that point. Moreover, as we decrease γ to zero, we get a smooth transition
to the unweighted value (γ = 0), where only global average per capita consumption is
considered and any regional differences are ignored.

3

Inequality within regions

The previous section developed an approach that takes inequality between regions into
account when estimating the Social Cost of Carbon. Yet, the regional disaggregation
in numerical models is largely an arbitrary choice, and it thus seems equally arbirtrary
to ignore any inequality within the regions of a given numerical model. Focusing on
countries or individuals as units of observations seems to be more appropriate on these
grounds. The argument for using individuals as the unit of observation is easily made:
the original idea of a utilitarian welfare function is to aggregate welfare of individuals.
The argument for using countries as the unit of observation is less direct. After all,
one could argue that country borders are as arbitrary as the regional composition in
a numerical model. However, there is a crucial difference: countries typically have
institutions that potentially address distributional objectives, whereas supra-national
regions typically do not. Moreover, since regions are heterogeneous also in terms of how
many countries are comprised into one region, it seems natural to argue that inequality
aversion between regions and between countries should be identical. Otherwise, the
composition of regions would alter the results, which does not seem consistent. Taking
into account inequality this way can essentially be done in a similar fashion as between
regions.
Now consider a region r where consumption cirt at date t is distributed according
to some distribution Frt (c) where the index ”irt” indicates that we implicitly consider
individuals (or countries) i within region r at time t. Average per capita consumption
R
in this region is given by cirt dFrt where the integral is computed over the domain of
Frt (cirt ). Since we use the same5 degree of inequality aversion γ between and within
5

From a technical point of view, disentangling the two different inequality aversion parameters between and within regions would be relatively straightforward, but does not seem normatively attractive
since the units considered are countries in both cases. Note that the standard approach of disregarding inequality between countries within regions amounts to assuming different degrees of inequality
aversion.

9

regions, this simply changes the welfare function (5) to

W

RC

1−η
! 1−γ
R
X
Prt Z 1−γ
1
cirt dFrt
=
Pt
(1 + ρ)−t ,
1 − η r=1 Pt
t=0

T
X

(9)

where W RC now takes into account global inequality in general and not merely between
regions.
While past and present GDP data are readily available for a large set of individual
countries, using forecasts based on historical data for long time horizons is problematic, in particular since small differences in projected growth rates can imply dramatic
changes for the estimated inequality between countries. Instead, we show how an aggregate measure of inequality can be equivalently used to characterize inequality within
regions. We use forecasts of within region inequality to investigate what effect that
inequality has on estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon. While the Gini coefficient of
inequality (Gini, 1921) is probably the most widely used measure of inequality, many
other proposals have been made in the literature, for example the additively decomposable Atkinson index (Atkinson, 1970) or the family of the generalized entropy indices
(Shorrocks, 1980). All of these indices can be traced back to a particular welfare function specification and thus by choosing one of them one implicitly takes on a welfarist
judgment. Given that our welfare specification is Utilitarian with an isoelastic utility
function, the family of Atkinson (1970)’s inequality indices is the natural choice, as
they are derived precisely in that framework.
The Atkinson index of inequality in any region r with a per-capita level of consumption of crt is defined as
Irt (γ) = 1 −

R
 1
cede
1−γ
1−γ
rt
where cede
=
c
dF
rt
irt
rt
crt

(10)

and where γ denotes the degree of inequality aversion between countries.6 It can be
interpreted as the percentage of per-capita income that would provide the same total
welfare than the actual income distribution if it were equally distributed. The “equally
distributed equivalent level of consumption” cede
rt introduced above can hence be exede
pressed as crt = crt (1 − Irt (γ)).
Since typically one does not have individual data on consumption, we assume a
particular distribution of consumption within each region. The log-normal distribution
6

ede
For the case of logarithmic utility (γ = 1), cede
rt is calculated as crt = exp

10

R


ln(cirt )dFrt .

has been found the preferred distribution to model income or consumption distributions,
see Atkinson and Brandolini (2010) and Provenzano (2015). We assume thus that within
2
any region that c ∼ LN (µrt , σrt
) where the parameters depend both on the region and
2
point in time. For the log-normal distribution, the Atkinson index is I(γ) = 1−e−0.5γσrt .
Now we can use the definition of Vx in (4) with the difference that now marginal utility
in any region is not anymore considered at the per capita level of consumption but
rather computed over the full distribution.
Apart from the inequality in consumption, the distribution of impacts from climate
change is the second main driver for the social cost of carbon. It is therefore crucial
what we assume about the distribution of impacts within the population and we consider
two different cases. We denote by dirt the damages or impacts accruing to individual
i in region r at time t so that in this region, the total damages can be written as
P
Drt = i dirt .
Firstly, we consider how the evaluation would look like if damages were equally
distributed on a per capita basis, that is, where dirt = Drt /Prt . However, the damage
of climate change are not likely to be evenly distributed between countries or individuals (Tol, 2002; Tol et al., 2004; Kverndokk and Rose, 2008; Yohe et al., 2006).
Therefore, we secondly consider a damage function approach where the distribution of
damages can be captured by an income elasticity. While the intra-regional distribution of impacts is an ongoing research field (Mitchell et al., 2002; Mendelsohn et al.,
2006; Yohe et al., 2006; Gall, 2007; Mendelsohn and Saher, 2011; Burke et al., 2015),
reliable estimates on the country level are not yet readily available. However, we can
use the the damage function already used at the regional level and apply it on the
within-region scale between countries, which is our second approach. We formulate the
solution by introducing an adjustment factor ∆rt to correct the total impacts given
by Drt used in (7). In the second case, impacts are depending on the consumption
level using a damage function approach within regions. Denoting by d(c) a damage
function depending on consumption, now the marginal value of damages within each
R
region can be computed as c−γ
irt d(cirt )dFrt . Given that we want the total damages
to remain unchanged,
the adjustment factor needs to be appropriately rescaled, which
R
−γ

cirt d(cirt )dFrt
R
. A typical specification for the damage function is an
yields ∆rt = R c−γ dF
d(c )dF
irt

rt

irt

rt

isoelastic function with a constant income elasticity. For instance, the damage functions
used in FUND can be written as a function of consumption of the form d(crt ) ∝ cαrt
where the proportionality depends on the change in mean temperature. The special
case of proportional damages (α = 1) is frequently used, as in Nordhaus’ DICE model.

11

In the appendix, we show that a very similar mathematical expression to this case can
be derived based on specific distributional assumptions about consumption and impacts
and their correlation, notably using a bivariate log-normal distribution, which allows
for a straightforward calibration.
We now compute the equivalent to the definition of the SCC as in (7) based on
the welfare specification (9) and derive analytical solutions. The following proposition summarizes the main result of this paper, where we show for the two different
assumptions about the distribution of impacts, how the Social Cost of Carbon can
be expressed based on standard regional disaggregated variables by only adding the
Atkinson inequality index.
Proposition 1. The Social Cost of Carbon taking into account inequality of consumption cirt and damages dirt within regions can be computed as
S

RI

=

R
T X
X
t=0 r=1

cede
t
cede
0

!γ−η −γ

crt
−(γ+1)
∆rt Drt (1 + ρ)−t
−γ (1 − Irt (γ))
cx0

(11)

where ∆rt captures the distribution of climate change impacts within regions which is
given for equal damages and the damage function approach as

∆rt =



1

if dirt = drt ∀i


(1 − Irt (γ))2α

if dirt ∝ cαirt

Proof. Consider the first case for ∆rt = 1. Based on the definition of the SCC in (7),
the only difference is that the sum of impacts is now considering the full distribution of
R ∂W
P
P
d dFrt . First, using the welfare specconsumption within regions, i.e., Tt=0 R
r=1
∂cirt irt
ification (9) we can compute the marginal welfare changeof one
unit additional unit of
γ−η
∂W
ede
0
−t
consumption in region country c of region r as ∂cirt = Prt ct
c−γ
irt Frt (cirt )(1 + ρ) ,
where cede
represents the global equally-distributed equivalent level of consumption
t
based on the global level of inequality. Using the subgroup decomposability of the Atkinson measure of inequality, it can be written as

cede
t



=

PR

r=1

P Prt
R
r=1

1−γ

Prt

[crt (1 − Irt (γ))]



where the definition of Irt (γ) is given by (10). Taking the sum over all regions and
integrating over each region’s income distribution, note that the only term that depends on the distribution within the region is c−γ
irt , so that we can compute its mean
R −γ
value as cirt dFirt . Due to the log-normal assumption about the distribution of conR
2 /2
−γµrt +γ 2 σrt
sumption, this value can be computed analytically as c−γ
. From
irt dFrt = e
12

1
1−γ

,

the definition of the Atkinson measure of inequality on the other hand, we have that
2
(1 − Irt (γ)) = e−0.5γσrt , and after several reformulations, one gets that the average
marginal utility in region r can be expressed using per-capita consumption crt and the
−(γ+1)
degree of inequality Irt (γ) as c−γ
. Substituting this expression in the
rt (1 − Irt (γ))
∂W
definition of ∂cirt back in the definition of the SCC in (4), we finally get for the case
where dirt = Drt /Prt ∀i (or that ∆rt = 1) the definition of the Social Cost of Carbon as
(11). For the second case based on the damage function, we use the same approach but
now take into account that d(crt ) ∝ cαrt . Using the assumption of a log-normal income
distribution within each region r, we can along the lines of the first part of the proof
compute ∆rt analytically and get in this case that ∆rt = (1 − Irt (γ))2α .
Whether or not in the case with damage function we have that ∆rt > 1 depends
on the parameter α. For α = 0 we have ∆rt = 1 and are back to the case of constant
damages as before. A positive income elasticity implies ∆rt < 1 or that evaluated
damages are lower than if they were constant on a per capita basis. By computing the
rt
= 2(1 − Irt (γ))2α ln(1 − Irt (γ)), which is
derivative of ∆rt with respect to α, we get ∂∆
∂α
always negative so that the SCC is always decreasing in α if damages are non-negative
(Drt ≥ 0∀r, t would be sufficient), or at least not “too” positive over the time horizon.
Besides the effect through the adjustment factor of impacts ∆rt , inequality affects
the social cost of carbon also through the term depending on Irt (γ) in (11). One
particular case, however, leads to both effects to exactly cancel each other so that
considering inequality within regions does yield the exact same value for the SCC as
the standard definition in (8): if γ + 1 = 2α holds (and γ = η or that no disentangled
welfare function is used)7 , inequality aversion and the elasticity of damages are such that
inequality does not matter for the SCC. For instance, with the specification γ = 1 and
α = 1, this condition is satisfied and we have that the SCC based on regional aggregates
is identical to the one if one where to consider the intra-regional distribution. This result
could be used as a justification for the standard approach used in integrated assessment
models. Finally, one can observe that the SCC in the second case is only affected by
α through the term (1 − Irt (γ))2α−(γ+1) . That is, any combination of γ and α leading
to the same exponent of this term will lead to the identical value for the social cost of
carbon.
7

Otherwise, the equally distributed equivalent level of consumption is still different due to income
inequality across regions. For the reasonable case of η > γ, the first term on the right-hand side of
(11) is smaller than one if the certainty-equivalent level of consumption increases over time, so that
the equivalence will be reached at a lower value of α.
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To sum up, Proposition 1 provides formulas for the marginal social cost of emissions
evaluated in region x taking into account income inequality between and within regions.
Moreover, inequality aversion between regions and countries (γ) and intertemporal inequality aversion (η) are now separate parameters of the model. The classical case
given by (3) is obtained by choosing γ = η and a degenerate distribution for Frt . From
the point of data requirements, only data on consumption inequality for each region
as measured by the Atkinson index is needed in order to compute the Social Cost of
Carbon. This model is therefore particularly useful in order to examine the sensitivity
of standard estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon with regard to the spatial resolution
employed and the restrictiveness of preferences of inequality aversion.

4

Inequality Data

The measurement of inequality involves several important analytical considerations to
be clarified. First, three different concepts of inequality at the global level have been
distinguished (Milanović, 2005). The first concept, often called international inequality,
refers to inequality between countries where each country is represented by a single
observation independent of its population size. The second concept, between-country
inequality or population-weighted inequality, considers inequality between countries
using population weights (“Concept 2”). The third concept, global inequality, reflects
inequality among world citizens taking all world citizen as individual observations. In
this paper, the second concept is the appropriate one, given that we use country level
data and don’t consider within-country inequality. Moreover, since the aggregation for
the computation of the Social Cost of Carbon considers impacts for all individuals, the
population weights should be used as in concept two.
Over the last decades, inequality8 has decreased mainly, but not exclusively, due to
the high economic growth rates in China. Inequality continued to decline after the year
2000, even if we exclude China. One reason for this convergence in terms of “Concept
2” inequality is the relatively high growth rate of India over the last decade. Yet,
convergence in this sense also occurred in other world regions (Sala-I-Martin, 2002).
It is noteworthy that the trend for global inequality according to the third concept is
less clear due to a potential increase of inequality within countries due to increasing
skill premia differentials (Sala-I-Martin, 2006). However, since we are interested only
in cross-country inequality here, we can abstract from this issue. In this paper and
8

In the following, we always use the concept of “Concept 2” inequality for inequality measures.
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the context of global climate change policies, it is in particular the differences between
countries that is relevant: Firstly, national tax and transfer schemes are arguably more
efficient in implementing a desired, if not optimal, income distribution than climate
policy. Secondly, national policies are likely to be implemented in order to achieve a
somehow fair sharing of the costs of abatement policies within countries. Therefore it
seems a meaningful first step to focus on inequalities between countries.9
Besides the different definitions of global inequality, a second conceptual issue is the
choice of the measure of inequality. While the arguably most widely used measure is
the Gini-coefficient, other measures include the Atkinson index, the Theil index, the
coefficient of variation, or the variance of log income10 , and others, as well as certain
ratios of different percentiles of income (e.g., the decile or quintile ratio). Many of
the indices can be linked to an implicit welfare specification. Since in the context of
integrated assessment modeling the isoelastic utility function is virtually omnipresent,
we use the Atkinson family of inequality indices I(γ).11 Moreover, this index satisfies
subgroup-decomposability so we can easily decompose inequality between and within
world regions. Historically, the evolution of the different indices of inequality over time
has been remarkably similar for the Gini, Atkinson, and Generalized entropy indices so
that this choice, while allowing consistency from a welfare perspective, does not seem
to limit the interpretations of the results. Figure 1 shows the evolvement inequality
since 1990.12
9

Adding within-country inequality to the picture would be straightforward based on equation (9).
However, we leave this extension for future research. Dennig et al. (2015) develop a first attempt in
this direction.
10
Note that these three indices are special cases of the class of the Generalized entropy index
11
As we explain in the subsequent section reviewing the literature, we use a parameter of γ = 0.7
when reporting this index throughout this section.
12
Data source: World Development Indicators 2015 for 147 countries, PPP-adjusted GDP in constant
international US-$ of 2011.
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Figure 1: Global inequality between countries, 1990-2014.

A third important conceptual issue is the conversion of national currency data in
order to compare income or consumption levels between countries. For inequality considerations, the use of PPPs seems more appropriate since it takes into account the
different relative price levels across countries and thus describes relative standards of
living across countries more accurately. If one wants to make claims about the welfare
people get from their incomes, these should be adjusted for purchasing power because
people get welfare from consumption, and consumption is purchased at the prices paid
in their country of residence (Sala-I-Martin, 2002). Since at market exchange rates a
large number of non-tradable goods are relatively less expensive in developing countries, using nominal or market exchange rates would overstate the (current) degree
of inequality between countries compared to the measurements using PPPs. For the
model simulations considered in this paper, it is noteworthy that while RICE is based on
PPPs, FUND uses market exchange rates.13 Therefore we use the respective exchange
rate concept for each model, noting that this will have a impact on the measurement
of inequality and its impact on the results. However, this can also provide a means
of comparing both approaches and highlight the differences between both approaches.
The following Table 1 summarizes the regional inequality indices computed for the regions that are used in both integrated assessment models used in this paper (RICE and
13

See Tol (2006) for a further discussion on the role of exchange rates in this context.
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FUND) for the year 2014:
FUND Region

I(0.7)

Gini

GDP (pc)

United States of America

0.000

0.000

51011$

Canada

0.000

0.000

35810$

RICE Region

I(0.7)

Gini

GDP (pc)

Western Europe

0.004

0.052

34772$

US

0.000

0.000

51011$

Japan and South Korea

0.021

0.099

29887$

OECD-Europe

0.004

0.052

34772$

Australia and New Zealand

0.000

0.000

43219$

Japan

0.000

0.000

33916$

Central and Eastern Europe

0.022

0.136

12767$

Russia

0.000

0.000

21664$

Former Soviet Union

0.147

0.295

14313$

Non-Russia Eurasia

0.103

0.279

8841$

Middle East

0.073

0.226

19932$

China

0.007

0.016

8011$

Central America

0.047

0.144

10755$

India

0.000

0.000

2987$

South America

0.024

0.099

12250$

Middle East

0.075

0.227

19845$

South Asia

0.024

0.108

3063$

Africa

0.241

0.468

3570$

Southeast Asia

0.075

0.191

9739$

Latin America

0.032

0.119

11806$

China plus

0.030

0.055

7710$

OHI

0.055

0.215

30957$

North Africa

0.019

0.113

7280$

Other non-OECD Asia

0.155

0.341

6059$

Sub-Saharan Africa

0.240

0.457

2841$

World

0.240

0.461

14317$

Small Island States

0.066

0.148

9966$

World

0.240

0.461

14317$

Table 1: Inequality indices and GDP per capita in USD (2011, PPP) for FUND and RICE
regions in 2014

One observation is that the inequality within most regions is lower than on the
global level. This results from the fact that the modeling regions are mostly chosen as
to reflect some degree of geographic and economic similarity. Moreover, there is quite
some heterogeneity across regions. While the global picture shows strong convergence
since the 1980s, the regional patterns differ substantially. While inequalities decrease
in Western and Eastern Europe, between Japan and South Korea as well as in North
Africa, this does not hold true for all regions. In particular, divergence has occurred
within Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, South East Asia and the Small Island
States. Overall, inequality across regions is very high considering the per-capita GDP
of between about 2.000 USD and 40.000 USD.
In order to introduce inequality into the calculation of the Social Cost of Carbon, we
need to make assumptions about inequality in the future. Notably, we need per-country
GDP and population projections to derive “Concept 2” inequality measures. Here, we
make use of the inequality prediction that has been produced for a large-scale exercise of
socioeconomic projections. The so-called Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) have
17

been developed as a reference to explore the long-term consequences of climate change
and the climate policy strategies (Moss et al., 2010). This process started with the
definition of five story lines describing five very different, but still reasonable “futures”
in terms of global and regional developments of technological progress, market developments, convergence, and population dynamics. These five scenarios provide within itself
consistent future developments that include scenarios of low economic and population
growth, different income inequality dynamics, and of high growth and divergence in
terms of population growth and economic development. Based on these five story lines,
population and GDP projections have been developed by the International Institute of
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) (KC and Lutz, 2015) for the population projections
and the OECD for the GDP scenarios (Crespo Cuaresma, 2015). The scenario SSP2
is characterized as “middle of road” scenario, so that in this paper we will consider
the inequality evolvement based on this scenario. Comparing the implications in terms
of income inequality, the results can be broadly seen in line with the few studies that
try to project convergence: the results of Bussolo et al. (2008) using a CGE model to
assess convergence in the future suggest that until 2030, inequality indeed decreases.
Sala-I-Martin (2002) also estimated that convergence is continuing due to the catch-up
of several poorer countries while at some point inequality could level off or even start
to rise again.
This continued convergence is reflected in the regional baseline projections used
in most of climate change models. The assumptions about regional economic growth
implicit in the FUND and RICE model already imply significant convergence across
regions. Figure 2 summarizes the predictions of inequality over the 21st century14 according to both models between the respective model regions (dashed lines). Moreover,
using the SSP2 inequality predictions within the model regions, we compute the global
inequality for both models and compare it to the global inequality implied by the SSP2
(solid lines).15
First, note that in FUND the computed inequality is much higher due to the use
of market exchange rates (MERs). Second, even between RICE and the SSP2 countrylevel data, inequality measures are slightly different due to different data sources and
near-term projections of regional GDP. We explicitly do not harmonize the assumptions
14

The projections of the SSPs extend until the year 2100. Since the modeling time horizons of the
IAMs go up to the year 2300 with a stylized GDP modelisation after 2100, we assume that inequality
within regions remains constant after the year 2100.
15
All indices are based on consumption per capita. For the SSP2, which predicts only GDP, we
assume a constant savings rate of 20%.
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here in order to keep the models’ characteristics. Therefore, the notable feature that
we introduce in the models is a significant convergence between countries over the 21st
century. Comparing inequality between and within regions, one sees that considering
country inequality adds about 0.05 to the Atkinson index. That is, the strong speed of
convergence is mainly captured by the difference in growth rates between industrialized
and developing country groups or regions.
Atkinson index (γ=0.7)
0.6

I(γ)

0.4

0.2
Model
country inequality
regional inequality

FUND
RICE
SSP2 [PPP]

0.0
2020

2040

2060

2080

2100

year

Figure 2: Worldwide inequality measured by I(0.7) between regions and all countries

Based on these inequality projections, we can compute the “equally distributed
equivalent” (EDE) and compare it to the per-capita GDP values. Figure 3 shows
both per-capita consumption and the EDE level of consumption taking into account
global inequality at the country level.16 Overall, there is a significant growth projected
although at a decreasing rate. The predicted convergence further increases the EDE
over time. However, it should also be emphasized that these results are based on
projections. In particular, they rest on the strong assumption regarding convergence
between world regions, which is maintained in most of the applied literature. Still,
it provides an educated guess different from simplistic assumptions about the total
disappearance or aggravation of inequalities. We therefore use this benchmark scenario
in the numerical analysis to compute the social cost of carbon.
16

The difference between the SSP2 and RICE on the one hand and FUND on the other reflects again
the fact the MERs are used within FUND.
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Per−capita Consumption and EDE (γ=0.7)
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Figure 3: Per-capita Consumption and EDE based on global inequality

5

Numerical models and preference calibration

In order to implement the analytical formula derived above, we use two widely used
integrated assessment models to estimate the Social Cost of Carbon, namely FUND 3.9
and RICE 2010.
The FUND model (Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation, and Distribution) was created primarily to estimate the impacts of climate policies in an integrated
framework. It takes exogenous scenarios of important economic variables as inputs
and then perturbs these with estimates of the cost of climate policy and the impacts
of climate change. The model has 16 regions and contains explicit representation of
five greenhouse gases. Climate change impacts are monetized and include agriculture,
forestry, sea-level rise, health impacts, energy consumption, water resources, unmanaged ecosystems, and storm impacts. Each impact sector has a different functional
form and is calculated separately for each of the 16 regions. The model runs from 1950
to 2300 in time steps of 1 year. The source code, data, and a technical description of
the model are public and open source (www.fund-model.org), and the model has been
used by other modeling teams before (e.g., Revesz et al. (2014)).
The RICE model is the regional version of Bill Nordhaus’ DICE integrated assessment model. RICE divides the world into 12 regions, and models each region as a
20

closed Ramsey-Koopmans economy. CO2 emissions are a by-product of production of
the final good. The model contains a simple carbon cycle and climate component that
drive damage functions for each region. There is one damage function for each region
that estimates aggregate impacts in that region as a function of global average temperature. The model runs from 2005 to 2595 in time steps of 10 years. We use the 2010
version of RICE that is described in Nordhaus (2010). The model is also open source
and can be downloaded from Nordhaus’ webpage.
One crucial assumption when running the models to compute the SCC is the
parametrization of the preference parameters discussed in the theory sections. For
the rate of pure time preference ρ, we use a central value of 1.5% per year and present
a sensitivity analysis that encompasses the range of values used in other studies of climate change. While some philosophers and economists argue in favor of a pure rate of
time preference of (almost) 0% as in the Stern (2006) review, many economists would
support higher rates e.g., Arrow et al. (1996). Our main justification for 1.5% as a
central value is that in combination with our central choice of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, interests rates in RICE roughly match observed interest rates, see
Nordhaus (2010). In addition, we keep the default parameterization of RICE with this
choice, and thus focus on the effect of regional inequality aversion alone17 .
For the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution η, the literature on
discounting and climate change has virtually never considered values less than 0.7 or
larger than 2. In this section, we choose the value of 1.5 to make the results comparable
to previous studies based on RICE. Using a lower value for η together with a higher
value of ρ would yield a similar consumption discount rate and hence similar results.
Moreover, using a higher value like η = 2 would even strengthen our argument that η
and γ should be disentangled: while such a high value would be in line with previous
choices for the inverse of the elasticity of inter-temproal substition, it would imply
implausibly high regional inequality aversion (see below). Together with the regionspecific growth rate, the two parameters ρ and η determine the (implicit) consumption
discount rate used within each region.
Regarding the value of regional inequality aversion γ, Pearce (2003) suggested values
between 0.5 and 1.2 in the context of climate change. In a recent study based on
official development assistance between countries, Tol (2010) estimated γ to be around
0.7. The U.S. Census Bureau (2010) considers values only between 0.25 and 0.75 for
inequality measurement in the United States. Moreover, as pointed out by Tol (2005),
17

FUND does not have a default central value for the pure rate of time preference.
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the industrialized countries do not reveal as much concern for the poor as is implied
by the equity weights using higher values of γ. Overall, the literature suggests lower
values for γ than for η, and most likley values less than unity. This is in line with the
results of Atkinson et al. (2009) who, based on a survey, find that individuals typically
have a lower value of γ than η. Therefore, a value equal or even larger than one for γ
seems hard to justify and we consider a baseline value of γ = 0.7.

6

Results

In the following we compute the Social Cost of Carbon with and without regional
inequality considerations and for different parameter specifications. All results are
shown in 2014 U.S. Dollars. The main results use the U.S. as the reference region
when converting from utility to a monetary metric. These results are therefore directly
comparable with present-value US mitigation costs, but cannot be directly compared
to mitigation costs in other regions. This would either require a further conversion or
the choice of a different reference region in the first place.18 We revisit the choice of
reference region in the sensitivity analysis that is discussed later.
Figure 4 shows the SCC for the standard equity weighting case (equation 3) and
our disentangled approach (equation 8) for different levels of inequality aversion. The
standard case is shown in blue where regional and intertemporal inequality aversion are
identical, i.e. a higher regional inequality aversion also implies a higher intertemporal
inequality aversion. The green line shows the disentangled case. Here, only regional
inequality aversion is varied, and intertemporal inequality aversion is kept constant at
η = 1.5. The SCC is highly non-linear in inequality aversion for both specifications. In
the standard case, regional and intertemporal inequality aversion are linked, and the net
effect of higher inequality aversion is thus ambiguous: higher intertemporal inequaliy
aversion will decrease the Social Cost of Carbon through a higher consumption discount
rate, but higher regional inequality aversion will increase the SCC because impacts in
poorer regions now receive more weight in the SCC. This explains the U-shaped curve
in RICE for the standard equity weighting case: for low γ values, the effect of γ on
the discount rate is stronger than on the equity weights, whereas the reverse is true for
higher values of γ. For the disentangled case, the effect of regional inequality aversion is
monotonic: higher regional inequality aversion always leads to a higher SCC since now
18

The choice of reference region does not change any cost-benefit analysis results when we apply the
same reference region in all cases when computing equity weighted results.
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only the equity weighting is changed whereas intertemporal inequality aversion (and
thus the discount rate) is held constant. Note that if a poor region is chosen as the
reference region, this effect goes in the opposite direction, i.e. the SCC would decrease
monotonically in regional inequality aversion.

Social Cost of Carbon (ρ =0.015, US normalization)
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Figure 4: Social Cost of Carbon for different levels of regional inequality aversion

So far, we only considered inequality between the regions of the numerical models.
Now we consider inequality between all countries between and within each model’s
regions. We combine this with different assumptions about the income elasticity of
impacts and compute the SCC according to (11). Maintaining our central value of
γ = 0.7, Figure 5 presents the SCC for different values of the income elasticity of
damages α (where α = 0 corresponds to the case of ∆rt = 1). The figure shows
three distinct cases: a) no inequality, b) inequality only between model regions, but
perfect equality within each model region, and c) inequality between countries. The
no inequality cases corresponds to a standard efficiency analysis that ignores income
differences between regions, whereas the regional inequality case corresponds to the
previous figure. The no inequality and regional inequality cases are independent of
α since α only determines how damages are allocated along the income distribution
within a region. First, note that considering inequality significantly increases the SCC,
roughly by a factor of 2-3. The difference between values based on regional inequality
and country inequality are comparably small for our calibration. As expected from
the results in section three, the SCC is moreover decreasing in the value of α. For
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each model there is some value ofα for which the SCC based on regional and country
inequality coincide.
With regard to the choice of the parameter α, so far very few studies have been
undertaken. In Anthoff and Tol (2012) the values of the computed income elasticities
vary between −1 and +3 with a mean of 0.99. The average values within each region
however lie almost all in the range 0.9 to 1.3. Considering a value of α close to unity
thus seems a reasonable assumption, so that considering within-region inequality will
lead to a reduction of the SCC, albeit a comparable small one. For larger values of α,
we obtain a lower Social Cost of Carbon than when impacts are equally distributed.
The reason for this effect is that absolute impacts are higher in richer countries (for
instance for α = 1 where impacts relative to income are constant). Due to the equity
considerations, however, these impacts are given a lower weight leading to a lower value
for the SCC. Overall, the inclusion of country inequality is a second-order effect for
the SCC, while the consideration of inequality and disentanglement of preferences has
a first-order effect.19

Social Cost of Carbon (ρ =0.015, η =1.5, γ =0.7, US normalization)
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Figure 5: Social Cost of Carbon with inequality at the country level

So far we reported all SCC values using the U.S. as reference region. Figure 6 shows
results for the other model regions as reference regions. Notably, for the case without
19

Note that as a special case, as discussed before, for α = 1 and η = γ = 1, the SCC estimates with
and without considering the distribution of consumption and impacts within regions will exactly be
equal.
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regional inequality aversion (γ = 0), the choice of reference region makes no difference
for the SCC. For higher levels of regional inequality aversion, the SCC estimate increases
for high income regions and decreases for low income regions, see Anthoff et al. (2009a)
or Nordhaus (2011). Earlier studies were not able to show the effect of an increase
of γ on the spread of SCC estimates between different reference regions, because any
change in regional inequality aversion also changed the discount rate in these earlier
studies. With our disentangled specification, the spread between regions increases nonlinearly in the degree of regional inequality aversion γ. Nevertheless, for values of γ
that we consider in this paper, the spread between different reference regions is much
smaller than the spreads reported in Hope (2008), Anthoff et al. (2009a) or Nordhaus
(2011). The main reason for this difference is that these studies had to make a choice
of either picking a degree of regional inequality aversion higher than the literature
suggests (so that their intertemporal inequality aversion is reasonable), or choosing
a degree of intertemporal inequality aversion lower than the literature suggests, but
achieving a reasonable degree of regional inequality aversion. In particular, the value
of intertemporal inequality aversion used in most studies has been considerably higher
than the values of intra-regional inequality aversion suggested by the literature above.
With the disentangled SCC formulation in this paper, one can simultaniously choose
reasonable numbers for both types of inequality aversion, which leads to a potentially
smaller spread between different reference regions compared to earlier studies.
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Figure 6: Social Cost of Carbon for different reference regions
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Due to the long time horizon of climate change, one crucial parameter for the evaluation in a CBA framework is the pure rate of time preference. Besides our base value
of ρ = 1.5%, we compute the SCC also using a very high and very low value.20 Table
2 shows the corresponding SCC values. As expected, a lower discount rate leads to a
(much) higher value of the SCC in general. Concerning the relative impact of country
and regional inequality21 , the relative sizes are similar in all three cases.
FUND
RICE
γ = 0 γ = 0.7 γ = 0 γ = 0.7
0.001 15.5
43.6
63.1
157.1
0.015
3.0
7.6
15.7
41.2
0.03
0.3
-0.6
6.6
18.0
ρ

Table 2: Social Cost of Carbon for different pure rate of time preference rates (regional
inequality for γ = 0.7)

To sum up our main results in Table 3, we take as a starting point the models’
default SCC value, which is obtained without considering regional inequality using our
baseline specification with ρ = 1.5% and η = 1.5. In this case, the Social Cost of Carbon
is computed for FUND at 3$ and for RICE at about 16$ per ton of CO2 , which are in
the range of the values computed e.g. in U.S. IAWG (2010) for policy making in the
United States. Taking into account inequality across regions based on the disentangled
welfare function with γ = 0.7, these values increase to about 8$ and 41$. Finally, taking
into account also inequality within regions has a minor impact and slightly reduces the
SCC. For our preferred specification of {ρ = 1.5%, η = 1.5, γ = 0.7, α = 1}, we finally
obtain SCC values of 7.0$/tCO2 for FUND and 39.5$/tCO2 for RICE. The small effect
of considering also within-region inequality indicates that a sufficiently large and wellchosen set of regions allows to account for most of the effect due to income and impact
disparities at the global level. Moreover, it is noteworthy that while the absolute values
are rather different between the two different models, the relative effects of inequality
at different levels are very similar in both models.
20

Note that using different values for ρ implies different region-specific consumption discount rates
since we maintain η = 1.5 in all cases. The range of plus/minus 1.5 percentage points we consider is
however relatively small so that the resulting discount rates can be justified.
21
Since we saw that the difference between the case with and without within-region inequality is
very low, we only report the case with regional inequality.
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parameter specification
model base value
η = 1.5, ρ = 0.015
disentangled inequality aversion
and γ = 0.7
and country inequality
and α = 1.0

FUND
3.0
7.6
7.0

RICE
15.7
41.2
39.5

Table 3: Social Cost of Carbon estimates in US-$ (2014), main results

7

Conclusion

In this paper we discuss the role of inequality aversion and how it can be integrated in
the computation of the Social Cost if Carbon. We extend previous results by disentangling regional inequality aversion from intertemporal preferences. Moreover, we show
how inequality between countries can be considered even using more aggregated numerical models. The disentanglement of preferences is crucial to separate equity effects
from the discount rate, whereas previous equity-weighted results were characterized by
a fixed link between regional inequality aversion and the consumption discount rate.
When considering intra-regional inequality, we moreover consider that impacts are not
equally distributed, but rather consider the income elasticity of impacts in order to take
into account regional differences.
We derive an analytical formula for the Social Cost of Carbon with inequality considerations and use two well-known integrated assessment models, RICE and FUND, in
order to numerically compute the resulting values for the SCC. The results confirm that
equity-weighting significantly affects the results, and hence that equity is a prime concern in climate policy. However, the exact implementation is crucial and in particular
the parametrization of inequality aversion can give rise to misleading results.
For the value of the Social Cost of Carbon, we find that equity weighting increases
the estimated value, even though for a reasonable value of γ = 0.7, the effect is less
pronounced than in previous studies. Taking into account differences between countries
rather than regions, this effect is slightly reduced due to a reduction in the speed of
convergence when considering individual countries. For our baseline specification, we
get for RICE (and FUND) a base value for the SCC of 15.7(3.0)$. With the disentangled
inequality aversion formula, this value increases to 41.2(7.6)$. Taking into account also
within-region inequality, this value decreases slightly to 39.5(7.0)$ per ton of CO2 .
Intuitively speaking, our findings reconcile the results that equity weighting implies
a higher SCC as in Fankhauser et al. (1997), Tol (1999) or Anthoff et al. (2009a) with
the view that due to convergence, considering inequality should give rise to a higher
27

discount rate and thus a lower SCC as in Hope (2008), Gollier (2015) or Nordhaus
(2011), or in the famous Schelling (1995) conjecture.
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Appendix A: The bivariate lognormal case
As discussed in the main text, an alternative way of deriving the results of this paper based on the income elasticity of damages approach is modeling the dependence
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structure between income and climate change impacts, which can be represented using measures of dependence of the two distributions such as the correlation coefficient.
Specifying the distribution of climate change impacts and correlation with consumption,
this allows a parsimonious specification based on available data sets on distributions
of impacts, consumption and their correlation to include distributional issues into integrated assessment models. In particular, a specifying a bivariate log-normal distribution
of income and impacts from climate change point in time t and in any region r seems like
reasonable approximation allowing for different degrees of dispersion of impacts. Most
importantly, the relatedness of consumption and damages is captured by a single parameter ρrt . From a methodological viewpoint, this specification is similar to the modeling
of an asset which is correlated with consumption as in the Consumption-CAPM model
in Finance, see e.g., Cochrane (2005), from which be borrow the methodology in this
case.
That is, we consider a joint distribution of consumption and damages within regions.
In particular, consider a bivariate log-normal distribution of income and impacts from
climate change as


(cirt , dirt ) ∼ LN µcrt , µdrt , σc2rt , σd2rt , ρrt
at any point in time t and in any region r. While being very reasonable for consumption,
note that this assumption precludes negative impacts, i.e., beneficial effects to accrue
within this given region. Still, the assumption allows for fat tails and different degrees
of dispersion of impacts. This assumption allows to capture the relationship between
consumption and damages by a single parameter, similar to the Consumption-CAPM
model in Finance. Based on this distributional assumption, we can compute the average
marginal utility of damages analytical using a similar definition of ∆rt in the analogue
for the result of Proposition 1. After several reformulations one can then show that we
can derive the term ∆rt as follows:
∆rt = e−γρrt σdrt σcrt = e−γCov(logcirt ,logdirt ) = (1 − I(γ)rt )2ρrt σdrt /σcrt .

(12)

This factor is greater than one if the correlation between impacts and consumption is
negative and vice versa. Having data on the national level or even on a finer resolution,
one can estimate ∆rt using the distribution and correlation structure estimated from this
data.22 Comparing this formula with the one of Proposition 1, one can easily see that in
22

Based on estimates of regional impacts and income or consumption data, ∆rt can easily be estimated based on their correlation and first and second moments as ∆rt =
(Corr(ccrt , dcrt )CV (ccrt )CV (dcrt ) + 1)−γ .
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the second case of a damage function with elasticity parameter α, the two approaches
lead to exactly the same results for α = ρrt σdrt /σcrt . That is, this specification allows a
more flexible form for estimating both the dispersion and correlation with consumption
of damages than the income or consumption elasticity case, while in the end leading
to the same model. Also, it can be easily seen that it collapses to the second case
based on a damage function with constant relative damages (α = 1), if we specify (the
logarithm of) damages and consumption with equal variances and a perfect positive
correlation. Finally, we get back to the case of equal damages (∆rt = 1) if consumption
and damages are uncorrelated (ρrt = 0).
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